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JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-610(4) allows a member who is aggrieved by a decision of the Utah
State Retirement Board ("Board") to obtain judicial review by complying with the procedures and
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or other appellate
court designated by statute to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
hearings.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure confer
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of the state.
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED FQR REVIEW
(1)

Were the Adjudicative Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, including

his conclusions from the Stipulated Facts, supported by substantial evidence?
(2)

Was the Board's interpretation of the term "overtime" erroneous?

(3)

Did the Board's interpretation of "overtime" interfere with O'Keefe's employment

relationship with Ogden City?
(4)

May O'Keefe invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the Board under

circumstances where he was aware of the conditional nature of the Board's earlier representations
and failed to present any evidence on detrimental reliance or injury suffered from the Board's
representation.

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW
O'Keefe may only be granted relief if, on the basis of the factual record, the court determines
that he has been prejudiced by Board action that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g).
The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or reweigh the
evidence. Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'a 850 P.2d 1175,1178 (Utah 1993), nor will an
agency's findings of fact be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion
from the evidence is permissible Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n. 767 P.2d 524,
526-527 (Utah 1988). It is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve conflicting
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the
agency to draw the inference. Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security. 854 P. 2d 570, 575
(Utah App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-203(1) (j), (g) and (1), the Board shall:
(j) develop broad policy for the long-term operation
of the various retirement systems, plans, and programs
and is granted broad discretion and power to perform
m policymaking fyinctiQps;
(g) maintain, in conjunction with participating
employers and members, the systems, plans, and
programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis,
subject to the responsibility of the Legislature to
adjust benefits and contribution rates when
recommended by the board;
2

(1) regulate the duties of employing units and other
public authorities which are imposed upon them by
this title and specify the time, place, and manner in
which contributions shall be withheld and paid, and
obtain any reports necessary for the administration of
this title, (emph. added)
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-102(1):
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a retirement
system for public safety employees which provides
the following:
(1) a uniform system of membership;
(2) retirement requirements;
(3) benefits for public safety employees;
(4) funding on an actuarially sound basis;
(5) contributions by employers and employees; and
(6) economy and efficiency in public service, (emph.
added)
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(1):
(a) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" means the
total amount of payments which are currently
includable in gross income made by an employer to an
employee covered under the retirement system for
services rendered to the employer as base income.
Base income shall be determined prior to any salary
deductions or reductions for any salary deferral or
pretax benefit programs authorized by federal law.
(b) "Compensation" includes performance-based
bonuses and cost-of-living adjustments.
(c) "Compensation" does not include:
(i) overtime;
(ii) sick pay incentives;
(iii) retirement pay incentives;
(iv) the monetary value of
remuneration paid in kind, such as a
residence, use of equipment or
uniform or travel allowances;
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(v) a lump-sum payment or special
payments covering accumulated leave;
and
(vi) all contributions made by an
employer under this plan or under any
other
employee
benefit
plan
maintained by an employer for the
benefit of a participant.
(d) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter may
not exceed the amount allowed under Internal
Revenue Code Section 401 (a)(17). (emph. added)
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(3):
"Full-time service" means 2,080 hours a year.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a decision of the Adjudicative Hearing Officer of the Utah State

Retirement Board, Judge James L. Barker, Jr., adopted by the Board on October 12,1995, denying
Appellant's request that the Board be required to accept overtime ("GAP") time contributions for
a four year period of time.
II.

Course of Proceedings
On May 31,1995, O'Keefe, Board and Ogden City entered into a written stipulation of facts

and appeared before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer of the Board, James L. Barker, Jr. Memoranda
of Law were submitted by all parties subsequent to the hearing. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer
then issued his decision in favor of the Board on October 12,1995.
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III.

Disposition By the Agency Below
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in support

of the Board's interpretation of overtime, and against O'Keefe's claims that the Board interfered with
his existing employment contract with Ogden City and his claims of equitable estoppel. O'Keefe
appeals from these findings and conclusions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 31, 1995, O'Keefe, the Board, and Ogden City, Third Party Intervenor, agreed to
a statement of facts and historical background which would "serve as the sole factual basis for the
determination in this case." (R. 22).
(1)

O'Keefe and other peace officers similarly situated are public safety employees employed

by Ogden City, and have been for the entire period of this controversy.
(2)

On July 1, 1985, Ogden City initiated a program whereby its peace officers, under certain

prescribed and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more than 40 hours per week.
(3)

In 1989, as a result of negotiations held between Ogden City and its employees, including

O'Keefe, an agreement was reached whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week but
not more than 43 hours per week could be treated in either of two ways:
a.

The three (3) hours in question (commonly referred to as GAP time) could be

taken later as leave, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or
b.

The GAP time could be treated as regular compensation (paid at regular - not

overtime rates), pursuant to which the officer would receive additional compensation on which
retirement contributions would be paid.

5

(4)

The effect of the additional compensation and retirement contributions in the final three (3)

years of O'Keefe's employment would result in an increase in the monthly retirement allowance of
O'Keefe - estimated as follows:
A.

Assuming a May 1,1995 retirement date:

If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional compensation is used in
the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit would be $1,819.68.
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional compensation is
not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit would be $1,697.34.
B.

Assuming a July 1, 1995 retirement date:

If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional compensation is used in
the calculation of the retirement allowance, the benefit would be $1,842.48.
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional compensation is
not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit would be $1,717.80.
Thus, O'Keefe's retirement allowance, if GAP time is determined to be eligible time worked
under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month.
(5)

In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions to the

Retirement Systems for those employees who chose to treat the three (3) hour additional time (GAP)
worked as "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate
participating members' accounts, including O'Keefe.
(6)

In 1991, due to an administrative oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden City. In

1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and 1992.
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(7)

Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS determined that the GAP time contributions

were ineligible and refunded the GAP time contributions to Ogden City for the appropriate years.
(8)

During the period from 1992 to the present, O'Keefe has taken the position that both the

original 1990 contributions and subsequent contributions were eligible and should not have been
refunded. URS has taken the position that the Office ruled the contributions ineligible as soon as
it had actual knowledge of the GAP time issues. Actual knowledge did not occur until sometime in
1992 when an employee sought to retire with GAP time included as part of compensation.
(9)

During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, O'Keefe, and others similarly

situated met in an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the law. During these
discussions, the Retirement Office agreed to resume its acceptance of GAP time contributions
conditionally while an additional study took place on the feasibility of developing a permanent
policy covering GAP time contributions. O'Keefe believed a permanent policy had been adopted
and the contributions were being accepted unconditionally.
(10)

Also during this time another employing unit, Weber County, requested GAP time coverage.

All the parties then agreed that the Board's actuary, Wyatt and Associates, should determine any
actuarial impact which would result from including GAP time in "compensation" for retirement
purposes.
(11)

The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letter to M. Dee Williams,

Executive Director of URS, on June 2,1994:
As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43hour work week. However, officers are allowed a
choice between (i) taking direct pay for the three
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional
comp time. Most officers take the time as comp time,
7

but as they approach retirement, officers can and do
switch to taking this as pay. By doing so, they
increase their Average Annual Compensation,
resulting in a higher retirement benefit.
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate
from 9.8% to 11.7%. Our calculation assumes that all
members elect to maximize their retirement benefit i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance
to increase their retirement benefits by 7.5% (the ratio
of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being
paid for earlier).
(12)

As a result of the actuary's findings and conclusions, URS resolved to permanently deny

GAP time contributions. An additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative, i.e.
URS decision to include GAP time would indeed be adding a benefit to the existing system at the
cost determined by the actuary. Such an added benefit with a potential cost to all employers and
employees, not just to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the Legislature, not URS.
(13)

O'Keefe has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden public safety officers

actually received a retirement allowance with GAP time included. The Retirement Office has agreed
to honor those retirements.
(14)

There are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers have

elected to take their GAP time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The essence of this controversy is whether a police officer who works more than forty (40)
hours a week, but less than forty three (43) hours (called GAP time) may have compensation he
earns from that GAP time included in the compensation used for calculating his retirement benefit,
when the definition of compensation for retirement purposes specifically excludes compensation
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earned from "overtime" work. The Board's position in this respect is that the Board is empowered
to determine what is and what is not overtime. Its interpretation should be afforded great weight by
the Court and is clearly reasonable under the circumstances. In no way did the Board's interpretation
of overtime either interfere with O'Keefe's employment relationship with Ogden City or cause him
to suffer injury.
ARGUMENT

POINT!
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE STIPULATION OF FACTS AND SHOULD BE
UPHELD BY THE COURT.
O'Keefe argues that the facts clearly indicate that he did not know of the conditional nature
of the Board's acceptance of contributions made on overtime worked. (Brief of Appellant P.20).
However, the findings of fact clearly contradict this assertion. Stipulation No. 9 states:
During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden
City, Petitioner, and others similarly situated met in
an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of
the law. During these discussions the Retirement
Office agreed to resume its acceptance of GAP time
contributions conditionally while an additional study
took place on the feasibility of developing a
permanent policy covering GAP time contributions.
Petitioner believed a permanent policy had been
adopted and the contributions were being accepted
unconditionally, (emph. added)
O'Keefe conveniently omits his own involvement in these meetings in his citation of
Stipulation No. 9 (Brief of Appellant P.20). The fact is O'Keefe was involved in the discussions
over the interpretation of the law on GAP time and overtime. He was in the discussions where the
Retirement Office agreed to resume its acceptance of GAP time contributions conditionally, and thus
9

he knew the conditional nature of the Board's acceptance of the contributions. It is not surprising
then, that the Hearing Officer found that he may have "believed" that contributions were being
accepted unconditionally, but he "knew" that the Board agreed to accept the contributions only
conditionally, and he also knew that the Board had exercised its right under the conditional
acceptance arrangement to deny the contributions prior to O'Keefe's retirement date.
POINT II
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH RESPECT
TO THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "OVERTIME" ARE
REASONABLE AND CONSISTENT WITH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW.

A.

The Board is statutorily empowered to define the term "overtime/'
The Board, acting in its administrative capacity in interpreting a state statute, is entitled to

have its interpretation afforded great weight, and should not be overturned unless clearly
unreasonable. Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah. 839 P. 2d 822, 824 (Utah App. 1992),
Oottfredson v. Utah State Retirement Poard, 808 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1991). This is especially so
where the agency has been granted discretion in defining a specific term. Morton Int'l. Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). Here the Board has
been granted this degree of discretion.
The power, authority and responsibility of the Board to administer each of the retirement
systems under its care is clearly and unequivocally established pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-1203(1)(j), (g) and (1), where the Board is required to:
(j) develop broad policy for the long-term operation
of the various retirement systems, plans, and programs

and j§ granted broad discretion and power to perform
its policymaking functions;
10

(g) maintain, in conjunction with participating
employers and members, the systems, plans, and
programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis,
subject to the responsibility of the Legislature to
adjust benefits and contribution rates when
recommended by the board;
(1) regulate the duties of employing units and other
public authorities which are imposed upon them by
this title and specify the time, place, and manner in
which contributions shall be withheld and paid, and
obtain any reports necessary for the administration of
this title, (emph. added)
Yet, despite this clear and specific grant of authority, O'Keefe still insists that the Board has
no statutory power to interpret the term "overtime." The Administrative Hearing Officer's
conclusions of law in this respect are not only reasonable under the circumstances, they are the only
conclusions he could have drawn.
B.

The Board's interpretation of the term "overtime" is reasonable and consistent with
state and federal law.
O'Keefe claims that there is no state definition of overtime and points to federal law, the Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as controlling in matters of compensation.
However, it is State law, Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(1), which establishes the definition of
"compensation" for retirement purposes, but specifically excludes from compensation.. . .
(l)(c)(i) "overtime . . ." While not specifically defining overtime, Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(3)
defines what is full-time service:
"Full-time service means 2,080 hours a year."
It certainly appears logical and reasonable for the Board to conclude then that contributions
made on compensation for hours worked in excess of 2,080 per year, or 40 hours per week, are
11

contributions for more than regular full-time work and therefore are contributions made on overtime
compensation. Even O'Keefe accepts the Board's assertion that he has a regularly scheduled 40 hour
tour of duty during a work period (R. 37).
O'Keefe cites to both state and federal personnel law to justify a different interpretation of
overtime. However, his claim that the Board must comply with these laws is simply erroneous. The
FLSA and the State's overtime policies for state employees govern the employment relationship
between an employer and its employees, not the relationship between the Board and members of the
state-created retirement system administered by the Board pursuant to Title 49.
Stated simply, there is no inconsistency with O'Keefe and Ogden City establishing what will
be considered overtime for purposes of their relationship and the Legislature and the Board
establishing a different and "uniform" requirement for overtime for all members participating in the
Public Safety Retirement System. (See Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-102(1)).
O'Keefe's final argument on this point would chastise the Board for its "restrictive"
interpretation and for not liberally construing the statutes to provide maximum benefits. But he cites
only half of the liberal construction statute. The complete statute reads:
This title shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits
and protections. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-102(2). (emph. added)
The maximum benefits O'Keefe seeks must be balanced with the maximum protections to
the integrity and funding of the Public Safety Retirement System. He would have the Board pay
retirement benefits on overtime compensation as long as the employer paid only regular salary rates
for the overtime worked. In Stipulation No. 11, the actuary explained the actuarial and financial
consequences of such an interpretation:

12

The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letter to
M. Dee Williams, Executive Director of URS, on June 2,1994:
As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43hour work week. However, officers are allowed a
choice between (i) taking direct pay for the three
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional
comp time. Most officers take the time as comp time,
but as they approach retirement, officers can and do
switch to taking this as pay. By doing so, they
increase their Average Annual Compensation,
resulting in a higher retirement benefit.
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate
from 9.8% to 11.7%. Our calculation assumes that all
members elect to maximize their retirement benefiti.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance
to increase their retirement benefits by 7.5% (the ratio
of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being
paid for earlier).
Indeed, taking O'Keefe's analysis to its logical conclusion, as long as regular pay rates are
used, the compensation earned for retirement purposes would be unlimited.

In the Board's

judgment, such an interpretation would violate its fiduciary responsibility under Utah Code Ann.
§ 49-1-203(1)(g) to:
maintain, in conjunction with participating employers
and members, the systems, plans, and programs on an
actuarially sound or approved basis, subject to the
responsibility of the Legislature to adjust benefits and
contribution rates when recommended by the board.
It could also unwillingly raise the contribution rates of all other participating employers and
employees in the Public Safety Retirement System since the overtime interpretation must be applied
uniformly to all members.

13

Rather than seek inappropriate relief through this Court, O'Keefe should petition the
Legislature for a plan benefit change so overtime can be included in the definition of compensation,
as it is for the retirement systems covering teachers and other public employees.
POINT HI
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF OVERTIME DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH
O'KEEFE'S EXISTING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT,
Contrary to O'Keefe's allegations, the Board did not "interfere" with negotiations between
Ogden City and O'Keefe in the establishment of a policy concerning GAP time. As stated by the
Adjudicative Hearing Officer, "no evidence exists on the record that the Board or its agents were in
any way involved in the negotiation process" between O'Keefe and Ogden City.
The provisions excluding overtime from compensation for retirement purposes were in state
statute at the time of the negotiations. In any event, representatives from Ogden City deny the
existence of employment contracts between O'Keefe and the City. The agreement which is
evidenced in the Stipulation simply establishes a policy governing the compensation payable to
O'Keefe if he works in excess of 40 but less than 43 hours per week. That part of the agreement is
unaffected by the Board's interpretation of overtime. However, by agreeing to pay contributions on
the overtime worked, the contributions became subject to the state statute governing compensation
which may be used in calculating the retirement benefit. Since the Board determined that GAP time
was overtime for retirement purposes, the contributions were made in error under Utah Code Ann.
§ 49-1-603 and were properly refunded to O'Keefe.
O'Keefe's arguments in this case bear a striking resemblance to those presented to and
rejected by three different divisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals.
14

In the first case, Ager v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n Bd.. 1995 Colo. App. Lexis
268, 19 BTR 1393 (Sept. 14, 1995 decided), one of the participating employers in the Colorado
Retirement System, Colorado State University (CSU) entered into an "accelerated retirement
agreement" with certain employees whereby CSU agreed to pay additional compensation in return
for the employees' early retirement. CSU also agreed to pay retirement contributions on the
additional compensation. However, Colorado Retirement System statutes provided that "bonuses
for services not actually rendered, including but not limited to early retirement inducements" were
not to be included in compensation for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. The Colorado
Retirement Board denied the additional compensation under its interpretation of the statute and the
employees appealed under the Colorado Administrative Procedures Act:
"on the basis of an error of law. . . [and] an error of
fact," that the Board's action was arbitrary and
capricious, that the compensation plaintiffs had
received pursuant to the Plan constituted salary for
purposes of calculating retirement benefits payable by
PERA, and that the Board was estopped from
reducing plaintiff's retirement benefits.
LI at 3.
Yet the court in Ager found for the defendant board, stating that:
The Board's authority to determine salary for PERA
[retirement] purposes does not conflict with the
university's authority to set the compensation for its
faculty. . . . The university may set compensation
for its faculty, but the Board must determine whether
that compensation. . . meets the statutory definition
of salary for PERA purposes.
LLatll.
See also Rumford v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n. 883 P. 2d 614, 616 (Colo. App.
1994) and Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n v. Stermole. 874 P. 2d 444, 446 (Colo. App. 1993).
15

Similarly here, the Board's authority to determine compensation for retirement purposes does
not conflict with Ogden City's authority to set compensation for its peace officers. The Board
however, is entitled to determine whether certain compensation, i.e. overtime compensation, meets
the statutory definition or exclusion.
POINT IV
O'KEEFE HAS NOT MET ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS PRE-REQUISITE TO
ASSERTING AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT.
Generally, estoppel is not assertable against the state and its agencies. See Eldredge v. Utah
State Retirement Bd.. 795 P. 2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) and Utah State Univ.. etc. v. Sutro &
Co.. 646 P. 2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). Even if it could be asserted in this case, O'Keefe must show
the following:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken
on the basis of the first party's statement, admission,
act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party
that would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act,
or failure to act.
See Pdredge, supra.
A.

Statement

The stipulated facts show that the Board did indeed agree to resume its acceptance of GAP
time contributions, but did so "conditionally" pending additional study on the feasibility of
developing a permanent policy governing GAP time. (Stipulation No. 9). Therefore, O'Keefe and
all others similarly situated were on notice of the potential for the Board to move in a different
direction with respect to acceptance of GAP time contributions. Under Stipulation No. 10, all
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parties, including O'Keefe, agreed to an actuarial study to determine any actuarial impact. When
the Board was informed of the negative actuarial and financial consequences, its decision to
permanently deny GAP time contributions was not inconsistent with its earlier position. It was
simply a foreseeable result of a study all parties were not only aware of, but approved. (See
Stipulation No. 10).
B.

Reasonable Action

O'Keefe has offered no evidence, either in the Stipulation or in his brief, that he took action
or refrained from action in reliance upon the Board's acceptance of the contributions. In fact, he and
others similarity situated continued to work, accrued service credit and subsequently controlled their
own retirement destiny. The cases cited by O'Keefe to support equitable estoppel are distinguishable
from his case.
In Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 795 P.2d 671 (Utah App. 1990), Eldredge relied
on the representations of the Board and resigned a $37,000 a year position. In Celebrity Club. Inc.
v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Club relied upon the representations
of the commission and expended about $200,000. In Nevada Public Employees Retirement Bd. v.
Byrne, 607 P. 2d 1351 (Nev. 1980), Byrne resigned a $23,000 per year position, sold his Las Vegas
home and purchased a retirement home in California.
Contrast these acts to those of O'Keefe, who contributed money on the GAP time but who
has already received a refund of those ineligible contributions. He now claims in his argument that
based upon a projected retirement benefit, he made decisions concerning retirement. Nowhere does
the record contain any evidence of his reliance on any projected benefit, or any evidence that he
retired in reliance on such representations. To the contrary, he knew long before his effective
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retirement date that the Board would deny contributions on overtime compensation. O'Keefe simply
did not act to his own detriment.
C.

Injury

Finally, O'Keefe must prove he was injured by the Board's decision to ultimately deny GAP
time contributions. Once again the Plaintiffs, in the cases cited by O'Keefe, (Eldredge. Celebrity
Club and Byrne), were injured in a specified and certified amount. In O'Keefe's case it was
stipulated that, dependent on O'Keefe's projected retirement date, he could receive between $122.34
- $124.68 less per month, based on the board's interpretation excluding overtime. O'Keefe might
indeed receive more than that amount if he continues to work. In any event, he knew prior to
retirement of the possibility that overtime would be excluded and had abundant time to adjust his
own retirement plans.
The situations which more closely parallel O'Keefe's situation are found in Holland v. Career
Services Review Bd.. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993), Andergpn v. ?V\)YK Service CQmm'n pf Utah,
839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), and Williams v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah
1988).
In Anderson, the Public Service Commission revoked Anderson's certificate of convenience
and necessity as a common carrier. Anderson argued that certain representations were made during
negotiations that should estop the Commission from revoking his certificate. The court held
Anderson's estoppel claim fails because it does not meet the high standard of proof required for
estoppel against the government. Anderson at 827. Citing the Celebrity Club and Eldredge
decisions, the court distinguished these cases because they "involved very specific written
representations by authorized government entities." M*
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The Holland decision applied the same rational in refusing to apply estoppel in a case
involving a state employee's eligibility for automatic reappointment to a position within the State
Office of Education.
In O'Keefe's case the stipulation clearly establishes the GAP time contributions would only
be honored pending further study on the issues. This hardly meets the standard of the specific
written representation favored by the court.
O'Keefe simply has failed to show the standards required to invoke estoppel.
CONCLUSION
While the Board is committed to maximizing retirees' benefits to the extent permitted by law,
it is equally committed to administering the systems in a uniform manner consistent with the
underlying actuarial assumptions governing the systems. To do otherwise would both violate the
financial integrity of one of the few retirement systems in the U.S.A. that remain funded on an
actuarial sound basis and blur the distinction between the Legislature's right to decide the benefit
structure for public employees and the Board's fiduciary duty to protect and maximize the benefits
thus granted. O'Keefe should simply ask the Legislature to change the definition of compensation
to allow for this increase in benefit.
Also, it is appropriate to comment on what is becoming a disturbing trend in the public
pension community and is evident in this and the Colorado cases. Under the guise of maximizing
benefits, an employee may seek to increase the compensation received in the final few years
preceding retirement for the purpose of enhancing the retirement benefit (which is usually calculated
on the basis of the final three (3) to five (5) years of compensation earned in a career). The problem
with this strategy is that it undermines the actuarial assumptions upon which the retirement systems
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DATED this 13th day of March, 1W6,

KEVIN A. HOWARD
Attorney for Appellee
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KEVIN A. HOWARD [4343]
Attorney for Respondent
560 East 200 South, Suite 230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 366-7471

BRIAN FLORENCE
Attorney for Petitioner
818-26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801) 399-9291

BUCK FROERER
Attorney for Ogden City
2484 Washington Blvd., #320
Ogden, Utah 84401-2319
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR.,
Petitioner,

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
BY PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT

vs.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Respondent.

Joseph W. O'Keefe, Jr, Petitioner, the Utah State Retirement Board, Respondent, and Ogd^
City, Third Party Intervenor, pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code
§63-46b-9, by and through counsel hereby stipulate and agree to the following background and facts:
RArKOROIIND

This case arises out of a disagreement between Joe O'Keefe, Petitioner, and others similarly
situated, who are police officers employed by Ogden City and the Utah Retirement Systems
("URS"), over the refusal of URS to accept retirement contributions on "GAP" time - i.e. a three

[KEVINVGAPl.MTNl

1

(3) hour period worked by Petitioner over mal dhovi; ilie teguhii I'11'!"" f
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L

c worked is "overtime" and is excluded from coverage undc- TT*~U

position is

law. The Petitioner's position is that this time should be treated as regula
*4 include "GAP" time in the final average

ordered to accept the contributions p,

salary rnmpnnent used to calculate Petitioner's retirement allowance. Both, sides agree ttidi i) MM
decision,, of the Hearing Officer is in,, favor of Petitionee i' t1 dcusio'
prospectively and retroai

* H h applied both

ontributions paid on behalf of Petitioner and others

similarly • situated since 1990.
The following Stipulation of Facte ts miciiJi J
determinat.
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Tr-v 1 ilir sole factual basis for the

- "company ing memoranda of law will be supplied in accordance with

the schedule established by the Hearing Officer,
STU'LlLATIur J Of FACTS
1.

>'Keefe and other peace officers similarlv situated are pubiti ijatety

employees employed by Ogden City, and have been loi (he tiMw f N • iu<l l il is c "nir'vn i v
2.

.
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iam whereby its peace officers, under certain

prescribed, and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more tha -;* - -.. ^ . . •. ;
3. "

In 1989, as a result of negotiations held heiwen i)ytlni

irloyees, including

jgieeiTieiii w.is rp.ir hed whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week but
not more 'than 45 lours per week could be treated in either of two ways:
a.)

The three

m (commonI v referred to as "GAP1" tune) could, be 'taken

later as leave, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or
fa.)

The "GAP" time could be treated, as regulai uiinpuiSiHion lp.*nl *i regular - not

overtime rates), pursuant to which the officer would receive additional compensation on
which retirement contributions would be paid.
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The effect of the additional compensation and retirement contributions in the final three (3)

years of Petitioner's employment would result in an increase in the monthly retirement allowance
of Petitioner - estimated as follows:
fa

Assuming a May 1,1995 retirement date:
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit
would be $1,819.68.
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,697.34.

B.

Assuming a July 1,1995 retirement date:
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit
would be $1,842.48.
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,717.80.

Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if GAP time is determined to be eligible time
worked under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month.
5.

In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions to the
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retirement systems few those »• npl" i'w^ ^h" m^v *i» treat the 3 hour additional time (GAP) worked,.
ti. "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate
participating members' accounts, including Petitionei
6.
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, itive oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden City, In

1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and .
7.
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cur until|pn employee

sought to retire vvh "! \\'} (inn, eluded as part of compensation.
9.
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During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, Petitioner, and others similarly

situated, met in, an, attempt to resolve tli

Mrttrrnii iiiiripnirthuns of the law

During these

discussions the i etirenieiit office agreed to resume its acceptance of Gap time contributions^while
A J additional study took place on the feasibility of developing a p^rm *.
contributions.
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- -1 during this time another employing unit, Weber (* >*.r % requested ^ap time .. iv -.: u •.
All the parties then agreed that the board s actual1 v. \
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ICMIII

ouia determine any

Horn including GAP time in "compensation" for retirement

purposes.
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The actuary's assumptions and, respor,

i a letter to M. Dee Williams,

'

Executive Director of URS, on June 2, 1994:
"As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-hour work week.
However, officers are allowed a choice between (i) taking direct pay for the three
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. Most officers take the
time as comp time, but as they approach retirement, officers can and do switch to
taking this as pay. By doing so, they increase their Average Annual Compensation,
resulting in a higher retirement benefit.
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate from 9.8% to 11.7%.
Our calculation assumes that all members elect to maximize their retirement benefit i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance to increase their retirement
benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid
for earlier)."
12.

As a result of the actuary's findings and conclusions, URS resolved to permanently deny

GAP time contributions. An additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative, i.e.
URS decision to include GAP time would indeed be adding a benefit to the existing system at the
cost determined by the actuary. Such an added benefit with a potential cost to all employers and
employees, not just to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the Legislature, not URS.
13.

Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden Public Safety officers

actually received a retirement allowance with Gap time included. The retirement office has agreed
to honor those retirements.
14.

These are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers have

elected to take their Gap time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute.
5

These facts constitute the entire background and facts upon whicn reuuoi
seek an adjudication. All parties &i\ ijiiqiuiii J, iii 1 (h'w.' to submit memoranda of law in support: of
ihi i! riA.pi'n li\ i iru.sitions, mcluding Ogden City, which will be in accordance with, the following
schedule:
\ f" iii11. •; ii'ini HI tiling of the Stipulation of Facts with the Hearing
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v
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_ day of March, 1995.
/
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Brian Florence
Attorney for Petitioner

}
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*u>o^

Buck Froerer
Attorney for Ogden City
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A Howar
* t or • v^ »or Respondent

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR.,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER TO DISMISS

Petitioner,

vs.
i

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,

:

Respondent-

Based upon the evidence received at the evidentiary hearing in this matter and the legal
memoranda submitted by both parties, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer makes the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:

HNDINGSOFFACT
1.

Petitioner, Joe O'Keefe and other peace officers similarly situated are public safety

employees employed by Ogden City, and have been for the entire period of this controversy.
2.

On July 1, 1985, Ogden City initiated a program whereby its peace officers, under

certain prescribed and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more than 40 hours per
week.
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If the URS does not accept contributions on "Gap" time and the additional
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,717.80.
Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if "Gap" time is determined to be eligible time
worked under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month.
5.

In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions

to the retirement systems for those employees who chose to treat the 3 hour additional time ("Gap")
worked as "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate
participating members' accounts, including Petitioner.
6*

In 1991, due to an administrative oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden

City. In 1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and 1992.
7.

Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS determined that the "Gap" time

contributions were ineligible and refunded the "Gap" time contributions to Ogden City for the
appropriate years.
8.

During the period from 1992 to the present, Petitioner has taken the position that both

the original 1990 contributions and subsequent contributions were eligible and should not have been
refunded. URS has taken the position that the Retirement Office ruled the contributions ineligible
as soon as it had actual knowledge of the "Gap" time issues. Actual knowledge did not occur until
some time in 1992 when an employee sought to retire with "Gap" time included as part of
compensation.
9.

During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, Petitioner, and others

similarly situated met in an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the law. During these
3

discussions the Retirement Iffk :- agreed u* ~esume its acceptance of "Gap"' time contributions
conditionally while an -,..

~ i) of developing a permanent

po I i r v <' f >verin c, '* Gapn time contributions. Petitioner believed a permanent policy had been adopted
and the contributions were being accepted unconditionally.
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employing unit, Weber County, requested "Gap" time

coverage. All the parties 'then agreed that the Board's actuary, Wyatt and Associates, should
determine any actuarial impact which wuunl

ICMHI

hum im u Inh> '* i.tn' inm m ""compensation"

for retirement t
11.

The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letier 10 M, Dee U " iKoni y*,

Executive Director of

; .S. on .1 it i ."!, I""«'"M
'

.-lb explained to us, Osden . . * officers have a 43-hour work week.
However, officers are allowed a
* ee:i (I) taking direct pay for the three
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. Most officers take the
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resulting in a higher retirement benefit.
'This policy increases the employer's contribution rate from 9.8% to 11.7%.
Our calculation assumes that all members elect to maximize their retirement benefit i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance to increase their retirement
benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid
for earlier).
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13.

Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden Public Safety

officers actually received a retirement allowance with "Gap" time included. The Retirement Office
has agreed to honor those retirements.
14.

There are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers

have elected to take their "Gap" time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Petitioner's appeal for inclusion of "Gap" time as compensation for retirement purposes and
for the Board to accept contributions thereon is based on a number of theories — each of them will
be discussed herein.
1.

Petitioner seeks a determination that federal law be used to define "overtime."

Petitioner is certainly correct that "overtime compensation" is subject to federal law. The stipulated
facts (No. 3) show that Petitioner and his employer, Ogden City, were aware of federal requirements
when negotiating the treatment of "Gap" time. However, just because federal law is applicable to
the treatment of "Gap" time between Petitioner and his employer does not mean that federal law
governs the operation of Utah's statutory retirement systems. In fact, public pension plans are
specifically exempt from the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") which
controls pension activities in general. Petitioner has not demonstrated that federal law controls. The
legislature is still free to establish what compensation is includable for retirement purposes.
The more persuasive argument is that state law controls. Under state retirement statutes,
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(1) (c)(1) specifically excludes overtime. No definition of overtime
appears under Title 49. However, Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(3) does provide that "full-time
service means 2,080 hours per year." Petitioner claims that should only be interpreted to establish
5

a minimum requirement for membership. However, the definition,, nsdt carries i.« i M. I. I i i J
application.

unreasonable, especially when coupled

with the actuary's conclusion that the adoption of Petitioners position would result in a substantial
increase both in benefits and in contribution rates for employer. unlhw I'mployees. Tins ..IPIKMI „', i
be wiin.

in conjunction with participating employers and

members, the systems, plans and programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis, ,

I, »i

Code Ann, § 49-1-203.
Therefore, this court concludes that state law, not federal law applies to this matter.
2.

Petitioner's second major contention is that the Boai d's interpretai

unreasonably interfered WL

veen Petitioner and his employer

a» '(I renrinH the member's right to contract for ; r^i -i

N

-*. t *. idence exists on the record that the

Board or its agents were in any way involved in the negotiation pii n ess *>emi\T «i f tj 1t11n >• i'•• • • i • ti 1i,s
employer. In I« i'»l iln -ilaluii's i iwerniiiy, ^Dispensation were in existence in 1989 at the time of
these negotiations. Petitioner and his employer should have known, this. The brief submitted by
Ogden City appears to support; the Board's position in this I herefore, this court concludes that the Board did not interfere with any contract, right of
Petitioner.
.3.

1 lie Itail .jiLfiijiiirni Ini 'wjjduJ bv hiiiioiiri is based on the doctrine of estoppel That
is Petitioner properly states requires (Da statement, admission, act o:r failure to act by one

party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (21 reasonable jcm i i iniinii i In ilir ndim pirtv
taken on the basis i .1 Hi I'u si | vi i, • suicn .rnt, admission, act, or failure to act, md (?) injury to the
second party that would result, from allowing the act, or failure to act.
6

Petitioner has not met his burden of proof for applying the doctrine. The stipulation states
that he reasonably believed that a permanent policy had been adopted and that contributions were
being accepted unconditionally. But, the stipulation also states that he was aware that the Board
agreed to resume its acceptance of "Gap" time contributions only conditionally, and that on June 2,
1994, prior to retiring, that the actuary had recommended raising the employer's contribution rate,
and that the Board had resolved to deny the "Gap" contributions. Therefore, this court concludes
Petitioner has not met the elements required to invoke the doctrine of estoppel.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Petitioner's request that the Board be required to accept "Gap" time contributions during the
last four years is denied.
Dated this

JdL

day of October, 1995.

James L. Barkerr~Jr.
Adjudicative Hearing Officer

^

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the Adjudicative
Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.
DATED this

/£

day of October, 1995.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
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